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eyelets; prohibition on distribution of supplies not produced by itself; prohibi-
tion on acquisitions of shoe machinery or shoe factory supply business or stock
in such business if the transaction involves more than $10,000.00; and non-
exclusive licensing on non-discriminatory reasonable royalty basis. Only time
will show whether the optimism is justified and unfortunately even this will not
be conclusive.
The list of remedies falls short of indicating adequately the details of the
firm's behavior which are proscribed and prescribed. Hence, aside from their
probable effectiveness in restoring competititon, the remedies raise the impor-
tant and paradoxical issue of detailed regulation of business conduct in enforcing
a law whose main purpose is to avoid government regulation of such conduct.
The critical comments made above should not be taken as representing a
judgment about Professor Kaysen's achievement. For this purpose they would
be quite unfair. The book will in fact be of substantial value to those who wish
to study the problem of monopoly and the method of dealing with it, and to
those who wish to study the shoe machinery industry as an example of this
problem. A tremendous mass of empirical data and argument has been reviewed
and organized in an orderly and useful manner. All the significant issues have
received a proper emphasis.
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The History of Negotiable Instruments in English Law. By J. Milnes Holden.
London: The Athlone Press, 1955. Pp. xxxix, 350. $7.00.
This small book-according to the preface-was prompted by a suggestion of
Professor Jenks,' some sixty years ago, that no serious study of "the origin of
negotiable instruments" in England had ever been done. The law writers, he
said, were disposed to devote only "a page or two of discursive remarks to the
historical side of the subject, as a sort of concession to decency." Of course, one
might protest that case law is itself history; but that would be to quibble, for
it is true that law text writers are concerned mainly with current black letter
law, not origins.
At all events, Holden has tried manfully to write both of "law" and of "his-
tory," or to fill the "gap" between the two, as he puts it. The book, however,
deals mostly with case law, although there is a considerable elaboration of eco-
nomic history, some political history, not a little of statutes, banker's recom-
mendations, the long jurisdictional contest between the courts in England, and
so on. Not much of this is new. In fact, following a suggestion of Holmes, made
just sixty years ago,2 casebook editors here have long presented much of Hol-
I Jenks, The Early History of Negotiable Instruments, 9 L. Q. Rev. 70 (1893).
2Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,469 (1897).
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den's "history" and "law" as daily student fare.3 But Holden has carefully re-
read the early cases, as also the works of Marius and Malynes, Holdsworth,
Street, Postan and the others, and has tidied up the record with many small
corrections. 4 He gives us a well written and fairly comprehensive account of his
findings, and as such it is most welcome.
As befits history, the book proceeds in chronological order. Four main periods
are marked out. The first from, say, 1200 to 1601, is disposed of in a scant thirty
pages. The second, from 1601 to 1710, which covers the early King's Bench
reports and the work of Lord Holt, is dealt with much more fully, as is the third
period from 1710 to 1882, which is distinguished by the opinions of Lord Mans-
field. In the fourth period, which brings the record down to date following the
adoption of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882, however, there is only incidental
reference to case law.
All in all, the reader is given a good introduction to the different types of paper
as they came into use, and a sense of their relationship to each other. One would
also expect that there would emerge from this an appreciation of the changing
role played by such paper in the trade and commerce of the time, such as Powell
gives the reader in his study of the money market.' But this does not quite
occur; Holden has kept his attention too closely fixed on historical details to
give much sense of direction or purpose.
Reference to the chapter on The Origin and Development of Cheques6 will
illustrate the point. Holden is interested in dates and disputation. He begins
by disputing Gilbart's assertion (p. 205) that banking in England started with
the London goldsmiths in about 1645. Banking, Holden says, is essentially "the
borrowing from some in order to lend to others" (p. 205), and it appears that
various scrivenors, including one Humphrey Shalcrosse, were engaged in this
sort of banking as early as 1638. Hence, a point is scored. Gilbart was wrong.
He next disputes Dr. Richards, who wrote that in the seventeenth century
something in the nature of a check was used by creditors of the Exchequer in
authorizing payment of their claims to others (p. 207). This device he thought
might have been the inspiration for the check as used by customers of the gold-
smiths at least as early as 1670. But it seems Dr. Richards was in error, and so
another point is made. By referring to the Act of 1882, Holden points out "that
a cheque is merely a special type of bill of exchange"; one drawn on a banker
3 Steffen, Cases on Commercial and Investment Paper (1939).
Few escape criticism: judge Henry, p. 8; Beutel, pp. 15, 25, 65; Street, pp. 28, 44, 46, 63,
75; Cranch, pp. 28, 82; Holdsworth, pp. 51, 56, 99; Fifoot, pp. 57, 60, 81, 217; Clapham, p. 93;
Dr. Richards, p. 207; Gilbart, p. 205; Chorley, p. 213.
6 Powell, Evolution of the Money Market (1915). The work is not cited by Holden.
6This is the English spelling, which appears to have been adopted (if not invented) by
Gilbart in 1828 (p. 209). Previously the word check had been in general use, and as the author
says: "To this day, Americans use the spelling check, though Canadians have adopted the new
spelling" (p. 209). And, "to this day," we also use "draft" more often than "bill of exchange,"
following in that regard-with some simplification-the early English practice to use
"draught." See Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516 (1764).
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payable on demand. "Thus, in searching for the origin of the cheque system,
there is no need to look any further than this ''7 (p. 208).
Whatever else one may think of this, it contributes very little to an under-
standing of the "cheque system." The revolutionary fact about banking, as
practiced by the London goldsmiths, was that they made loans of their credit
greatly in excess of the moneys received on deposit (or borrowed).8 At first they
paid out their own notes on such loans, but as Lord Chorley has pointed out,9
the "cheque" became an important "supplement to the bankers' notes" in the
eighteenth century. In fact, he wrote that it "came into existence" then. That
is to say, the banker had discovered that he could loan his credit in excess of the
cash on hand quite as effectively by giving the borrower a deposit credit, subject
to check, as by paying out notes. It has been this expansive quality of the
system-restrained in this country by the reserve machinery-which has given
the check its great significance as a sort of "deposit currency." In this sense
Lord Chorley was right when he wrote that the check came into "existence" in
the eighteenth century. 0
Even on the law side, the reader may well have misgivings." Holden is per-
suaded that Lord Holt's work has not had proper recognition, and sets out to
put the record straight. It was "the genius of Holt, C. J.," he says, "which made
the period, 1601-1710, the most vital in the history of negotiable instruments"
(p. 30). In fact, "it was Holt who laid the foundation, without which Mansfield's
work would have been impossible" (p. 30). But, while it is true that many im-
portant cases came up during Holt's time, it is not so clear that he contributed
much. The affirmative case rests largely on Holt's brief opinion in 1699, holding
that a purchaser from the finder of a bearer "bank bill" could not be held liable
7 The fact, of course, is that there were very few cases early dealing with checks as such. In
this country, in fact, there was serious doubt whether a check was so much like a billof exchange
that a delay in presentment would work a complete discharge of the drawer. And the rule
here, as in England, is now to the contrary. Also, while the court in Robson v. Bennett, 2
Taunt. 388 (C.P., 1810), regarded a "marked" check as in the nature of an accepted bill,
Holden does not mention the case or discuss why the certified check never came into use in
England.
8 It was this, in fact, which caused the outcry in 1676 by the writer of the pamphlet, "The
Mystery of the New fashioned Goldsmiths or Bankers." Yet Holden, so far from showing any
appreciation of the matter, says the writer of the tract should be treated with "reserve": "His
object was to expose the goldsmiths' business as pernicious" (p. 212).
9 Chorley, The Cheque as Mandate and Negotiable Instrument, 60 J. of the Inst. of Bank-
ers 391 (1939).
10 Holden misses the point and, taking Chorley's statement literally, says the opinion must
"be rejected." He sets out three checks, the earliest of which is dated 16 February 1659, to
make his point. Even so, the older system, by which debtor and creditor presented them-
selves at the office of the goldsmith to effect payment, continued for some time. See Ward v.
Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 928 (K.B., 1703).
" Holden starts his book by adopting a question begging-and very bad-definition of
"negotiability," taken from the opinion of Justice Blackburn in the unfortunate case of
Crouch v. The Credit Foncier of England, Ltd., L.R. 8 Q.B. 374,381 (1873). It becomes a sort
of base line.
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in trover by the loser.12 Holt's reasoning-or instinct-was sure and simple;
the case had to be decided that way "by reason of the course of trade, which
creates a property in the assignee or bearer."'13 Thus, for the first time in the case
of a bill, 4 as Holden puts it, "a chariot 5 had been driven through the hitherto
impregnable lines of the common law maxim nemo dat quod non habet" (p. 64).
The negative case rests on the furor which Holt caused, only two or three
years later, when in Clerke v. Martin,6 he refused emphatically to allow a payee
to declare upon an order note, as being within the custom of merchants. A year
later, in Bullet v. Crips, 17 he refused to allow an indorsee to do so. Here, surely,
Holt got right out of his chariot again.
The report in Clerke v. Martin states:
Holt Chief Justice was totis viribus against the action; and said, that this note could
not be a bill of exchange. That the maintaining of these actions upon such notes, were
innovations upon the rules of the common law; and that it amounted to the setting up
a new sort of specialty, unknown to the common law, and invented in Lombard-Street,
which attempted in these matters of bills of exchange to give laws to Westminster-
hall."8
In Bullet v. Ciips, although Holt had spoken with two of the most famous mer-
chants in London "to be informed of the mighty ill consequences that it was
pretended would ensue" if the action was not allowed, 19 he saw no reason to
change his view.
Lord Holt did succeed in one thing, for Parliament shortly after-contrary
to Holt's rulings-proceeded to put notes on much the same footing as bills of
12 Anon., 1 Salk. 126 (K.B., 1699). 13 Ibid.
14 Probably the instrument was not a bill of exchange at all, but a bank note. Consult
Lord Mansfield's opinion in Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. 452 (K.B., 1758). Bills were seldom made
payable to bearer at this time, while the contrary was true of notes.
is Holden also puts Lord Somers in the "chariot" with Holt; but omers had done some-
thing quite different in Anon., 1 Comyns 43 (K.B., 1697), the authority cited by Holden
(p. 64). It was there decided that a person taking a bill in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt
was to have his remedy against the drawer in spite of a failure of consideration. It had long
before been held that a purchaser for a valuable consideration would be given such rights. Chat
v. Edgar, 1 Keble 636 (1663).
16 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 758 (K.B., 1702).
17 6 Mod. 29 (Q.B., 1703).
is Clerke v. Martin, 2 Ld. Raym. 757, 758 (K.B., 1702). I rather like Holt's independence,
however unjudicial it may be. There is an even better example of his attitude in Ward v. Evans,
2 Ld. Raym. 928 (K.B., 1702). In holding that a bank note given in satisfaction of a debt is
only conditional payment, Holt said: "But then I am of opinion, and always was (notwith-
standing the noise and cry, that it is the use of Lombard street, as if the contrary opinion would
blow up Lombard-street) that the acceptance of such a note is not actual payment." Ibid., at
930. Holt agreed, however, that a third party note taken in purchase of goods may be payment,
thus fastening upon the law a troubling distinction with no substance. E.g., Hamilton v. R. S.
Dickson & Co., 85 F.2d 107 (C.A.2d, 1936). Yet Holden hails it as a "principle of lasting
importance which was wisely settled by Holt. . ." (p. 85).
19 Holden says blandly: "There is no doubt that Holt's practice of consulting the merchants
enabled him to develop the rules of mercantile law on sound lines" (p. 79).
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exchange." Holden makes a brave effort to answer Holt's many critics by saying
he was bound to reach the results he did because of certain precedents (p. 80 et
seq.). The argument would carry more conviction if Holt himself had indicated
that he felt bound in that way. It seems more accurate to say that Holt was con-
fused. He had never got the point clear in his thinking that suits between immedi-
ate parties are to be distinguished from suits between a subsequent holder and a
prior maker or acceptor.21 Therefore, to make sure that failure of consideration
would be a defense in the first, as it should be, he heatedly denied that a note
could come within the custom of merchants 2 Next, when faced with the remote
party case, as he was in Buller v. Crips, he obstinately stuck by his guns, al-
though the difference was fully argued before him. These are not the marks of
a truly great judge.
In the third period, 1710-1882, Holden joins with the others in attacking
Mansfield's views on consideration (p. 134 et seq.) particularly as stated in
Pillans v. Van Mierop.21 Mansfield there said: "In commercial cases amongst
merchants, the want of consideration is not an objection." While Holden ap-
pears to be sympathetic to this idea, he too sees no way around the ancient dic-
tum of the House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes2 4 that: "All contracts are, by the
laws of England, distinguished into agreements by specialty, and agreements
by parol," and, in the latter case, "a consideration must be proved." It would
take too long to show that, on the facts before Mansfield in the Van Mierop
case, the notions of consideration worked out in ordinary two-party situations
should have little application. His decision was dearly right. Not "considera-
tion," but "the course of trade," may be the controlling factor. Perhaps there
are more than two kinds of contracts.
But enough has been said to give the flavor of Holden's book. In the conclud-
ing chapters he departs from history to take up a number of suggestions for the
future. These are mainly concerned with crossed checks and the possibility of
giving the paying bankers still further protection from losses due to forged or
unauthorized indorsements. Fortunately, the latter is of only academic interest
here as American bankers have done quite well carrying such risks as an insur-
able cost of doing business. Holden does discuss one point, though, which is dis-
quieting, for he suggests that the bill of exchange is at last on the way out and,
worse, that nothing much can be done about it.2s Partly this is due to the fact
20 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9, § 1 (1704).
21 Holden says: "Holt C.J. was not to be persuaded to make such a fine and illogical dis-
tinction" (p. 79). But, some years after the Statute of Anne the distinction was made clear,
and it is in no sense illogical. Brown v. Marsh, Gilb. Rep. 154 (1721).
2 This is fairly apparent from Holt's denial that a note is a "specialty." Holden effectively
refutes those critics who have said that Holt regarded a bill of exchange as a specialty (p. 62).
23 3 Burr. 1663 (K.B., 1765).
24 7 T.R. 351 n.(a) (K.B., 1778).
2 5 Holden has made no effort to look at American law or practice. He does not mention that
a new Uniform Commercial Code has been drawn up on this country.
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that business organizations have been getting so much larger, but it is also be-
cause other ways of financing have become more comfortable. It would surely
be too bad to lose the bill, considering what great expenditures of mental effort
have gone into its making.
RoSCOE STEFFEN*
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
Law in Economy and Society. By Max Weber. Edited with an Introduction and
Annotations by Max Rheinstein. Translation by Edward Shils and Max
Rheinstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. lxxii, 363.
$6.00.
Max Weber's Sociology of Law (which is the core of the book in hand) is
without question the deepest and richest job which has appeared in that exciting
field.
As I look back on these words I am troubled because they are meant to say
much (e.g., "deep" and "rich") but they in fact say so little ("deepest" and
"richest" as against what?). Let me try to squeeze the net meaning into this:
To get, as a man-of-law, to or toward where, as a man-of-law, you want to get,
calls for thought not only about your own problem coming up next Tuesday,
but also it calls vigorously for thought about what human experience has dug
up about how problems of this kind have been handled on a multitude of other
Tuesdays or Wednesdays. The results of that kind of thinking men commonly
call "theory." Such theory, when put into words, guides and smooths practice,
and is in turn constantly re-checked and re-informed by practice and by any
newly emerging practical problems. In almost all fields such theory has first
been ignored or scorned by the practical expert (say, the seaman up to the fif-
teenth century, the American farmer of the nineteenth century, the factory pro-
duction man until the arrival of Ford and Taylor and industrial engineering,
and especially the American practicing lawyer from 1880 until today). But
every time the sustained quest for such theory has taken hold on any large scale
the results have been amazingly fertile. The question is: Why not also in the
law? Can we not, in that most vital and practical of areas, substitute such
things as celestial navigation for expert coast watching and the hunches of the
man who is just "born to it" or who has just gotten it "by experience?" Do we
not need, in the work of law as well as in that of corn-growing, to try to find
,some hybrid product of greater yield, greater toughness against risks, and,
above all, one which is more readily and reliably available to any lawyer and
to any of his clients? Who can with reason say that law alone, among the an-
cient human crafts, is impervious to infiltration of improvement by way of such
a quest for "theory?"
It is against such a background that Max Weber wrote this book, from about
1909 to 1913. "Theory" in the legal field had already drifted in Germany, as it
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